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To explore changes in the concept of happiness, the syntactic behaviour of the 
adjective happy is traced from its first occurrence in the early 14th century (in 
Northern dialects) to the 19th century. The Middle English data are taken from 
the electronic Middle English Dictionary, the Corpus of Middle English Prose and 
Verse, and the Innsbruck Computer Archive of Machine-Readable English Texts. 
For Modern English a self-constructed corpus from the Gutenberg Project and the 
Online Books Page, originally designed for a different purpose and concentrating 
on literary prose of the 18th and 19th century, is used. On the hypothesis that happy 
originally referred to favourable conditions due to chance (i.e. an external condition) 
and acquired the modern meaning of being content with the conditions of one’s life 
(i.e. a mental or affective state) in the course of time, colligations are selected which 
are capable of manifesting either ‘internal’ or ‘external’ conditions. For ME the most 
useful distinction is between ‘bringers’ and ‘recipients’ of hap (roughly: ‘happy 
events’ vs. ‘happy people’), for ModE between an external condition, an enduring 
attitude and an emotion-like state with physical symptoms and of relatively short 
duration. Important syntactic and semantic changes are found in late medieval 
mysticism and romance and in the early 19th-century novel.
1 Introduction
1.1 The Problem
Happiness is one of the most persistent topics of European philosophy and theology, 
but the words happy and happiness are comparative latecomers to the English 
lexicon. According to the MED the first occurrences of happi are in the Cursor 
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Mundi, a Northumbrian poem written c1300.1 The noun happiness is not even 
listed in the MED although it occurs at least once in ME writing. Beniamin Minor, an 
English rendering of a Latin tract by Richard of St. Victor (fl. 1141–73), is probably 
an early work by the author of the Cloud of Unknowing (14th century, second half), 
who seems uncomfortable with the word. Having translated feliciter (ultimately from 
Gen. 30,11) as happily, he renders felicitas as “happynes or selynes, wheþer þou 
wilt”, using only selynes in the rest of the text (Hodgson 1955, 27). This reluctance 
to use a probably newly formed word is remarkable in a writer known for his many 
neologisms (Burrow 1984, 141; Hodgson, 1955, xxxii). A similar uneasiness is found 
in Chaucer. In his translation of Boëthius’ De Consolatione Philosophiae (“Boece”) 
he usually renders felicitas with another neologism, welefulnesse, which he explicitly 
prefers to felicite.2 Welefulnesse found only a small following among Chaucerians 
like Lydgate and Usk (see also Rissanen 1997, 244). Felicite, a loan from French, 
is frequent in Chaucer’s and Gower’s poetry (Tatlock & Kennedy 1927, Pickles & 
Dawson 1987). But only in the 15th century does it find a generally accepted place 
in prose: Trevisa (a1387) translates Higden’s felicitas in a variety of ways, the second 
translator (1432 x 1450) uses felicite throughout. Richard Misyn, translating Richard 
Rolle, renders felicitas as happis (Misyn 1896, 80 l. 17; Rolle 1915, 247) and hap 
(Misyn 1896, 130, l. 35; Rolle 1995, 68), and elsewhere as felicite (7 times).
The OED entry happiness gives as its first witness Palsgrave’s Lesclarcissement 
de la langue françoyse 1530 (translating prosperité), though s.v. savour, savor (v.) a 
quotation from Alexander Barclay’s Shyp of Folys (1509) contains the word. Quite 
clearly, there was a discontinuity in the discourse on happiness which enabled 
or required new words to enter. Yet another discontinuity is signalled by the fact 
that today happiness is usually regarded as an emotion,3 whereas in the classical 
tradition the elimination of emotions (πάθη, affectūs) was essential for the attainment 
of happiness. To complicate matters, English happy has a wider meaning today 
than close equivalents in other European languages. When we say that we are 
happy to do something that is merely a polite way of saying that we are willing.
1 The Helsinki Corpus assigns the original Cursor to 1250–1350 (Header “<O 1250–1350>” in 
Helsinki file CMCURSOR.TXT). Hence probably Rissanen’s claim that happy as well as hap (n.) and 
hap(pen) (v.) “can be found […] from early Middle English on” (1997, 246).
2 “(the heritage is to seyn the doctryne of the whiche Socrates in his opinyoun of felicite, that I 
clepe welefulnesse)” (Boece I p. 3, ll. 29–32). Felicite occurs twice in the Boece. Here it translates 
summum bonum from Trivet’s commentary (Gleason 1987, 100); in III p. 10, l. 193 it renders beatitudo 
from Boëthius’ original text. On Trivet’s presence in Chaucer’s Boece see also Benson & Robinson 
1005. A presumably exhaustive list of Trivet echoes in the Boece is given by Minnis 1993.
3 Word-listing experiments will show happiness among the first six emotions (e.g. Fehr & 
Russell 1984, 470); see also Fabiszak (2001, 92, fn. 42): “ ‘happiness’ and ‘joy’ […] are often used 
interchangeably in psychological literature.”
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1.2 The History of Concepts and the History of Word-use
In this somewhat complex state of affairs a paradigm shift seems in order. The history 
of happiness is usually discussed as the history of a concept, i.e. as a philosophical 
problem. But ethical concepts like ‘happiness’ do not exist in specialized discourse 
alone. They arise from ordinary word-use, and they may affect ordinary word-use 
in return. A history of word-use has a number of advantages over a history of 
concepts. Above all, the pool from which it can draw its data is wider in terms of 
both text genres and word classes (the history of concepts is usually confined to 
nouns); its data will also be more tangible and better defined. On the other hand 
the mass of data will impose severe limitations on the research design and the 
relevance of the results. We can study the collocational and colligational behaviour 
of words with considerable methodical rigour, but the results may not tell us very 
much about the thinking of the past.
In this dilemma I will analyse the occurrence of one word, the adjective happy, 
in a number of colligations which I expect to be diagnostically useful.4 My aim 
resembles that of the students of linguistic metaphor who try to find an idealized 
cognitive model behind our language use (for happiness see above all Kövecses 
1991 and this volume), though the historian of word-use has the advantage of 
drawing on utterances made by specified individuals in specified contexts on a 
specified number of occasions. Still better, we can risk zero-assertions like “I am 
happy is not said in ME.” Admittedly, our evidence will always be incomplete, but 
it can always be supplemented. Our results are thus open to useful disagreement. 
Since the data bases for ME and ModE differ considerably I will defer the more 
narrowly methodological questions to sections 2.1 and 3.1.
But in order to select diagnostically useful colligations a little conceptual analysis 
is required even now. Since ordinary language-users categorize happiness as an 
emotion, and since this marks a radical change from the original concept, we must 
look at the concept ‘emotion’ first. Von Wright implicitly positions happiness in 
relation to other emotions by comparing it with pleasure and joy:
Pleasure, joy, and happiness are things of increasing degrees of permanence and 
resistance to change. […] A piece of news, say of an unexpected inheritance, can 
make a man jump with joy. But whether it makes him happy as distinct from merely 
glad can only be seen from effects of a longer lasting and less obvious showing on his 
subsequent life. (1963, 96f.; italics vW.)
4 I define ‘colligation’, following Siepmann (2005, 431), as “the grammatical company” of a word, i.e. 
the other words with which it tends to co-occur in a chosen construction. ‘Collocation’ is to me merely 
the tendency of a word to occur in the (syntactically undefined) neighbourhood of other words.
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With his descriptions and examples von Wright moves happiness away from 
the prototypical centre of the category ‘emotion’. Typical emotions are processes 
following a script of comparatively short duration (Fischer 1991), whereas happiness 
is a state which is expected to last much longer and does not follow a script. But 
von Wright also mentions a feature which happiness and the core emotions have 
fully in common:
[…] whether a person is happy or not depends upon his own attitude to his circumstances 
of life. The supreme judge of the case must be the subject himself. To think that it could 
be otherwise is false objectivism. (1963, 100f.; italics vW.)
This principle is so important that it deserves a name. Let us call it the ‘subjectivity 
postulate’. It distinguishes emotions and happiness from, for instance, physical 
states like health, illness, drunkenness or fatigue: only I know whether I am angry 
or sad (or happy), but a doctor may know better than I do whether I am ill or drunk 
or tired. What to von Wright is a logical necessity is to Locke an empirical fact 
(Book II, ch. 21, §58, I 224): “As to present happiness […] a man never chooses 
amiss [italics in 5th ed.].” Locke and von Wright are agreed that people may be 
mistaken on their “prospects of happiness” (1963: 99, italics vW; cf. Locke op. cit., 
§60, I 225). But while Locke insists that “virtue and religion are necessary to […] 
happiness”, von Wright distinguishes the “primarily […] utilitarian notion” of welfare 
from the “primarily hedonic notion” of happiness and admits that he has been unable 
to form a clear view on the nature of their relation (1963: 88). In ordinary language 
these two notions are, of course, not clearly distinct – a confusion with potentially 
dramatic consequences. For if everybody is the only judge of their own happiness 
and at the same time can invoke the American Declaration of Independence which 
guarantees the divine and inalienable right to pursue it, unending strife seems to be 
the inevitable result. It is important to realize that the signers of the Declaration of 
Independence are closer to Locke than to von Wright and us. While to von Wright 
happiness is to like the circumstances of one’s life, the signers’ understanding could 
be defined as a life whose circumstances are liked and valued by any rational and 
virtuous human being. To assume such a meaning in the Declaration may be just 
plain common sense. But we cannot be satisfied with an assumed meaning merely 
because it suits us: we must be able to support our assumption with evidence.
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2 Middle English
2.1 The Data Base: Corpora
The ME data come from the eMED and the Corpus of Middle English Prose and 
Verse (CMEPV). Both are freely accessible at <http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/m/mec/>.5 
The eMED is of course the electronic version of the MED. For information on word-
use it is vastly superior to the printed MED because one of its search options 
enables us to find any word or word-beginning we want in the quotations which 
illustrate the word-senses distinguished in the dictionary. Thanks to this function 
it can be used as a ‘dictionary-as-corpus’, with an estimated size of about 20.5 
million running words.6 In the case of happi/y the quotations search exactly trebles 
the data base: not only the 29 attestations s.v. happi but also a further 58 in the 
rest of the dictionary. This extension of the data base has its price, though: the 
58 genuinely additional quotations had to be picked manually from the return of a 
Boolean search for “happi* OR happy*” which yielded a total of 442, the eliminated 
majority being spurious matches or multiple quotations.
A Boolean search of CMEPV yielded 124 genuine matches. Eliminating 
duplications with the MED, the total of easily accessible attestations of happy/i 
amounts to about 190. A useful supplement to CMEPV is provided by the Innsbruck 
Computer Archive of Machine-Readable English Texts (ICAMET) which holds a 
number of religious prose texts not in CMEPV.7 These instances of happy will be 
approached with basically one question: under what conditions, and in respect 
of what, is who or what said to be happy? The question may sound complicated, 
but the answers can be inferred pretty straightforwardly from the context – mainly 
though not exclusively from the syntactic co-text. This is most evident with “who 
or what?”: is ‘being-happy’ predicated of the person who experiences happiness, 
or of the condition(s), event(s) or moment(s) which shape the person’s fate? What 
makes people happy? The conditions under which they have to live, or their 
attitude to these conditions? Is being happy a momentary state or a more durable 
quality, perhaps even a character trait? Since happy enters the language in the 
late Middle Ages it is also pertinent to ask whether happiness is to be found in 
this life or the next.8
5 For terms and conditions see <http://www.press.umich.edu/webhome/mec/sitelic.html>, last 
visited 18/02/2007.
6 My own estimate, based on the following figures: number of quotations in MED (acc. to <http://
www.press.umich.edu/titleDetailDesc.do?id=6787>, last visited 18/02/2007): 891,531; average 
length of MED quotation, based on a sample of 450: 23. 891,531*23=20,505,213.
7 See <http://www.uibk.ac.at/anglistik/projects/icamet/availability/index.html> for conditions of 
use.
8 McMahon (2006, 137) points out that similar words (bonheur, Glück) originated in other European 
languages about the same time. I thank Heli Tissari for drawing my attention to this book.
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2.2 Happy and hap
Happy is derived from hap, a Norse word attested already in Layamon’s Brut (MED, 
s.v. hap (n.)). The basic meaning of the noun is simply what ‘happens’ to a person, 
“a person’s lot (good or bad)”, as the MED puts it. This definition is apt because it 
connotes the element of chance. The default or unmarked sense, however, is ‘good 
luck’. ‘Bad luck’ is usually qualified by an adjective; alliterative poetry is naturally 
fond of hard happes. When hap is paired with grace in theological tracts, it will 
often mark a contrast, as when the gifts of Nature (kinde), Fortune (hap) and Grace 
are listed (e.g. Dan Michel, 24). Hap is close to Fortuna, as shown in Dan Michel’s 
reference to “þe lheuedi [=Lady] of hap” turning her wheel (ib.).
Poets familiar with the Boëthian tradition, like Chaucer and his follower Thomas 
Usk, will also exploit the contrast. Learning that Troilus has fallen in love with his 
niece, Criseyde, Pandarus turns that love into a divine gift: “not […] hap, but grace” 
(TrCr I 896).9 In less learned poetry, including even Lydgate, collocations using both 
hap and grace serve as mere line fillers with no pretensions to theological nuance 
(e.g. Lydgate, Reson l. 5096–7, Pilgrimage, l. 21471–2). The (Northern) Surtees 
Psalter uses hap to translate gratia, the Gawain poet’s Cleanness and Patience 
for the Beatitudes of the Sermon of the Mount. On the whole, it is therefore the 
favourableness of the condition that is important, not whether it originates with 
God or fortune. These observations have implications for the semantics of happy. 
Remarkably, this is not so with the adverb, hap(pi)ly, where the neutral reading 
seems more normally apposite (cf. MED, s.v. happīlī (adv.)).
2.3 Happy: ‘Bringers’ of hap
Happy may be predicated of ‘givers’ or ‘bringers’ as well as of ‘recipients’ of hap. 
Human hap is said to be influenced by constellations and the time-units defined by 
them (days, hours) as well as by the actions of other humans. Again, the default 
meaning of happi is positive. John Metham’s “Days of the Moon” (pp. 150f.), for 
instance, identifies days as “happy to begynne alle werkys vp-on” or “happy to by 
and to selle vp-on” (similarly Lydgate, Siege, l. 386). Events or actions can also be 
bringers of hap. Hoccleve calls Eve’s accepting the apple from the serpent “happy to 
man-kynde” (Letter of Cupid, l. 393). In the Fairfax MS of the Cursor Mundi Joseph’s 
interpretation of Pharaoh’s dream (Gen. 41) is called “happy rede” (l. 4677).
In more literary narrative the context suggests occasionally a more ambivalent 
reading. The voyage of Agamemnon’s fleet to Troy (Lydgate, Troy Book, 2.6257) 
and the day of Troilus and Criseyde’s first encounter (TrCr II, 621) are called happy 
9 All Chaucer quotations are from Benson & Robinson. See also Usk, Bk. II, ch. 3, p. 79: “grace 
and non hap”.
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though the consequences are not entirely positive. In the case of the fleet the 
mood of the voyagers is strictly irrelevant to the story although it can be seen as an 
ironic contrast to the outcome and Lydgate’s amplificatio does everything to create 
a pleasant atmosphere. Troilus and Criseyde are embarrassed rather than joyful 
at their encounter: they are caught between their involuntary emotions and their 
social duties. The day, moreover, does not inaugurate a happy future but leads, as 
the reader knows, “Fro woo to wele, and after out of joie” (TrCr I, 4).10 
This interpretation seems to use the notion of context in an extremely broad sense 
(covering a distance of over 1,600 lines in fact), but indicators of the inevitability 
of the encounter are also found in the nearer neighbourhood (e.g. II 623), and 
they dominate the plot at least from I 204ff., when the God of Love decides to 
punish Troilus for his contempt. The important thing is: when happy is predicated 
of a bringer the positive meaning is not sufficiently ‘entrenched’ to overrule any 
contextual clues to the contrary.
But it is not only events, actions and constellations that hap-bringing can be 
predicated of. Persons can also be bringers, e.g. Jesus Christ and his mother. In the 
York Play of the Presentation in the Temple Simeon hails the Christ child as “happy 
to great and to small” (Beadle 158, Play 17, l. 368), in the “Appearance of Our Lady 
to Thomas” Mary is addressed as “happy to helde to” ([it brings luck to submit to 
you] Beadle 395, Play 45, l. 138). Even animals can be “happy to mete” – when they 
are worshipped as idols, as they are in Mandeville’s Travels (Warner, p. 82).
2.4 Happy: ‘Recipients’ of hap
Turning now to the recipients of hap, we can start with two striking observations: 
(1) they invariably have good fortune; the ambivalence or neutrality of hap is absent 
in this construction. And (2), perhaps even more remarkably, they tend to be 
presented as habitually happy rather than only occasionally. Being happy seems to 
be a character trait rather than a mere accident.
Given Dame Fortune’s notorious changeability, the preponderance of habitual 
good fortune in the texts may be astonishing – as long as we do not take a closer 
look at those texts. One example from ‘advice’ literature and a large number from 
narrative literature will make the point clear:
10 Benson & Robinson (497) glosses happy as ‘lucky’, but even this does not do full justice to the 
ambivalence of the lovers’ future.
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(1) He is right happy þat encrecithe & kepe[th] … the lordship that his predecessours 
has left him, and he is vnfortunat þat lesithe it. (Dicts ed. Bühler, 140 l. 13)11 
Hap is ‘specialized’ on the recipients’ side even more than on the bringers’: 
people may be happy to gammys sere (Cursor Mundi 3505, MS. Fairfax), in batelle 
(Higden, 15th-century transl., IV 309), in armes (Alliterative Morte Arthur, ll. 1741, 
2974, 3878) or unto the werrys (Malory, ed. Vinaver, p. 270, ll. 35f.), in marchandise 
(Mandeville’s Travels, ed. Hamelius, Part II, ch. 17, vol.1, p. 98), til alle worldes 
welthes (Pricke of Conscience, Part II, l. 1339), to wowe (good at matchmaking, 
Paston Letters I 480), or unto love (HF l. 1757, Chaucer’s earliest use of the word). 
Chauliac mentions happy leches (MED s.v. fortunat (1a)), Dunbar even a happy 
woman (i.e. one who has “wylis […] in luf,”: Twa mariit women and the wedo, l. 464). 
What I have called ‘specialized luck’ appears as ‘skilful’ in the MED (s.v. happi, 
sense 2b), and no doubt fighting, trading, hunting, surgery and even love-making 
are skills. But so are cooking, farming, weaving and a host of other activities, and yet 
there is no talk of happy cooks, ploughmen, weavers, etc. Is there a feature which 
the first group has and the second lacks? It seems the first group of activities is 
carried out under unpredictable conditions, often against human ‘adversaries’ who 
will not behave as passive objects like wool, farmland, or food. These recipients of 
hap have mastered fortune either by following principles of wisdom or by continuous 
practice. Perhaps we should call them ‘earners’ rather than recipients.
2.5 Happiness a Gift of Grace or of Fortune?
The hap which recipients receive can be specified by three binary oppositions. It can 
be (1) a gift of grace or of fortune, (2) heavenly or earthly, (3) objective or subjective 
(sensu von Wright). The distinction between happy and gracious seems to be even 
less observed than that between hap and grace. A good test case is Trevisa’s 
translation of Higden’s Polychronicon. On one occasion he is forced by his original 
to observe the distinction: In Book IV, cap. 2 Higden writes about Herod: “In rebus 
quidem domesticis infelicissimus, in aliis fortunatus” (IV 288). Trevisa renders it as: 
“He was most ungracious in homeliche þinges, and happy in oþer þinges” (IV 289). 
Elsewhere he translates fortunatus and felix as gracious and in various other ways, 
though never as happy. His anonymous successor is fairly consistent in translating 
both words as happy or fortunate, but he skips the passage just quoted.12 
According to CMEPV Malory uses happy twice in doublets: nat happy nother 
fortunate (Book VI, ch. 10, Vinaver 268), happy & gracious (Book XII, ch. 2, Vinaver 
11 Similar advice appears op. cit., p. 299, l. 19, in Ashby’s Dicta (p. 373) or is quoted in a narrative 
like The Destruction of Troy (Panton & Donaldson, ll. 1432, 11217).
12 Cf. the verdict of the editor, Ch. Babington: “[W]hen he could not construe a sentence he passed 
on to the next” (Higden I lxix).
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820).13 A close analysis, for which there is no space here, suggests they are 
hendiadys – a figure using two words but conveying only one meaning. A definitive 
answer would of course require a more thorough study of LME translations, but the 
evidence available to me suggests that the opposition of grace vs. fortune is only 
rarely observed.
2.6 Happiness Earthly or Heavenly?
There is only slightly more evidence for a lexicalized distinction between heavenly 
and earthly happiness. I have found three instances of happy paired with blessed 
(Arderne 7, Ashby 373, Chaucer, CT, Melibee, ll. 1675–1680, Benson & Robinson 
235), but it is only in Chaucer that the doublet may be said to imply a distinction. 
Chaucer modifies his French model:
(2) ‘Wel happy and blessed been they that louen and purchacen pees, for they been 
called children of god.’ ‘Bieneurez sont ceulz qui ayment et purchacent paix […].’ 
(Askins 2002, 396)
The French is by Renaud de Louens, MS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS 
fr. 578, which is generally regarded as the text closest to Chaucer. If Chaucer 
was indeed using this text, he was apparently uneasy about the translation of 
bieneurez, for which wel happy clearly is a calque. On the four other occasions 
when Chaucer uses happy it is closely associated with Fortuna;14 the addition of 
blessed in this case helps to weaken the association. The combination of happy 
and blessed makes the Seventh Beatitude (Matt. 5, 9) do double service as a 
piece of practical advice, showing the road not only to heaven but also to success 
in this world. The peacemakers are not only beati or blessed, they are also happy, 
presumably in the sense of ‘successful’. Such an insertion is not only in keeping 
with the double meaning of the allegorical Tale of Melibee; it also suggests that 
Chaucer saw happiness as basically confined to this world and added blessed for 
the heavenly dimension.
But Chaucer was of course an unusually sensitive user of English, and thus 
hardly representative of his language community. More ‘ordinary’ usage may be 
found, for instance, in dictionaries, where both happy and blyssyd stand for beatus 
as well as fortunatus and felix.
13 The CMEPV text is out of date. The quotations were of course checked, but it is possible that 
Vinaver’s text contains more doublets than are found in CMEPV.
14 CT Melibee 2745–50, Tr Cr II 621 (cf. 2.3.), 1382; HF 1757 (cf. 2.5.). 
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?c1475 *Cath.Angl.(Add 15562)   60a Happy. Beatus, felix.
1483 Cath.Angl.(Monson 168)   35 Blyssyd. Faustus, fortunatus, felix.
(1440) PParv.(Hrl 221)   226 Happy, in goodnesse. Felix.
(1440) PParv.(Hrl 221)   226 Happy. Fortunatus.
(1440) PParv.(Hrl 221)   40 Blessyd, erthely. Benedictus, felix.
(1440) PParv.(Hrl 221)   40 Blyssyd, hevynly. Beatus.
(1440) PParv.(Hrl 221)   452 Sely, or happy. Felix, fortunatus.
?c1475 *Cath.Angl.(Add 15562)   67b Joy. Felicitas, gaudium mentis, solamen, solacium.
c1450 Trin-C.LEDict.(Trin-C O.5.4)   582/31 Selyhede. Felicitas.
Table 1. Happy and blyssyd in Latin-English Dictionaries (from MED quotations).
There is, however, some important evidence to the contrary. Richard Misyn 
translated Richard Rolle’s De Emendacione Vitae and De Incendio Amoris in 1434 
and 1435, respectively. The Fire of Love is to my knowledge the only religious text 
using happy with any frequency (Margery Kempe and Julian of Norwich do not 
use it at all!). It consistently translates Rolle’s felix, while beatitudo becomes bliss 
or blissfulness (as in Chaucer’s Boece), and blessed represents either beatus or 
benedictus (as in the Promptorium Parvulorum, see Table 1). Bliss is the state to 
be expected in the next life. By contrast, the soul is happy because it is enjoying 
communion with the Deity while still in this life.
2.7 Happiness Objective or Subjective?
Rolle describes his ecstasies as accompanied by strong physical symptoms such 
as heat, sweetness and intoxication (Misyn 3, l.5; 12, l.13; 12, l.27; 34, l.11; 72, 
l.13f.; 85, l.4; 95, l.33). These experiences qualify as emotional in a very modern 
psychological sense: not only for finding physical expression but also for being of 
limited duration (Misyn 3, l. 55). Apparently Rolle is giving us the first instance of 
fully ‘subjective’ happiness.
When BE .. HAPPY15 is used in the first person singular it is difficult to apply the 
objective / subjective opposition; the distinction between ‘in circumstances to be 
valued by all rational beings’ and ‘in circumstances actually valued’ is otiose unless 
the speaker excludes himself from the community of rational beings. Still, we can 
usefully ask what is in the foreground: the circumstances or the emotional reaction 
to them. John Paston II describes himself as “nott happy to wow” (Davis 1971, I 480; 
cf. above section 2.4, last para); in Caxton’s Charles the Grete Ganellon reports his 
15 Capital italics are chosen to refer to an entire paradigm rather than a single form, i.e. in this case 
including am happy, was happy, etc. – Adapting a convention of the MED quotations, two dots are 
used to indicate the place of optional elements (such as very in quotation 4).
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narrow escape from 20,000 Saracens with “I was wel happy […]” (p. 189 l. 7). Both 
times the ‘objective’ reading is entirely satisfactory. ‘I am ill at ease matchmaking’ 
introduces an irrelevance. Equally with Ganellon: the ‘happiness’ of his escape 
highlights the magnitude of the danger; in ModE he would say I was lucky. It also 
stresses the threat which the Saracens pose to Charlemagne and his host – and, 
by implication, the courage with which the danger will be met. For Ganellon to tell 
the Emperor how he felt during his escape would be almost impertinent.
If in the majority of cases an ‘objective’ interpretation is to be preferred, that 
does not mean that the ‘subjective’ one is always wrong. The best illustration is an 
exemplum in An Alphabet of Tales: the Duke of Marseille and his wife are converted 
by Mary Magdalene. After an apparently long period of childlessness their prayers 
to the saint are answered. Anxious to learn more about their new religion, they want 
to see St. Peter in Rome. During a storm at sea the duchess dies while giving birth. 
The duchess and the (living) child are abandoned on land; the duke continues his 
journey to St. Peter. After two years he returns to the place, where he finds a little 
child on the beach who runs away and hides under his mother’s mantle. The duke 
follows, lifts the mantle and exclaims:
(3) “O þou, Marie Magdalen̛! […] how happy war I if my wyfe war now on̛ life & myght 
go home with me into myne awn̛ contretℏ […].” And at þis wurd ̛ þe womman̛ was olife 
& rase vp, […]. And þan̛ þai aƚƚ samen wente hame vnto Marsulie […]. And when̛ þai 
come at home þai feƚƚ on̛ kneis befor ̛ Marie Magdalen̛ & thankid ̛ hur hertelie, & tolde 
hur aƚƚ how it had happend ̛ þaim. (Banks 1904–05, 313, ch. 458)
The following points seem worth noting, because they or similar ones reappear 
in the other texts which suggest a ‘subjective’ reading of happy:
– the phrase BE .. HAPPY is used in the first person singular, though not in the present 
tense but in the past subjunctive, the “subjunctive of unreality” (Mustanoja 1960, 
455–457);16
– it is used to express an extremely strong wish which is most unlikely to be fulfilled;
– the language is highly emotional, particularly in the sentence which contains happy: 
the saint is invoked using the interjection ‘O’, the adjective is preceded by a ‘booster’ 
(the “exclamatory how”, cf. Quirk et al. § 8.105);17
– after the happy-making event, the adjective is not used again; as a consequence no-
one is actually described as ‘happy’.
16 Cf. Burrow & Turville-Petre 1992, 48: “The past tense of the subjunctive is used where Modern 
English uses ‘would’ to express something that is unlikely to happen.”
17 Our example is cited MED, s.v .‘hǒu conjunctive adv.’, sense 3b: “to what an extent or degree!”
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The number of examples to be found in CMEPV is too small to draw any 
far-reaching conclusions, but it seems plausible to assume that the ‘emotional’ 
sense of happy was not sufficiently ‘entrenched’ to be understood without special 
markers, as found in our example. Happy is used to express a wish, not to describe 
a state. Texts showing this use of happy form a small, rather well-defined group: 
Melusine (p. 356), Caxton’s Blanchardyn and Eglantine (p. 41), and the alliterative 
Wars of Alexander (p. 267 l. 5381). With the exception of the Wars (a translation 
from Latin), they are translated from the French. These findings antedate the OED 
records for senses 2b and 4 cited by Rissanen (1997, 247) by almost a century18 
and suggest that these senses should also be included in the MED. The subjective 
sense of happy seems to be an emergent category: there is a growing need to 
describe ‘inner’ happiness (apparently induced by translation), but the concept 
is not sufficiently established to lexicalize the opposition between the two kinds, 
between ModE happy and lucky.
3 Modern English
3.1 The Corpus, and Methods of Analysis
ME is represented by closed corpora which contain about 150 texts with 3 to 5 million 
words and are well known to the scholarly community. For ModE we have websites 
like Project Gutenberg <http://www.gutenberg.org> and the Online Books Page 
<http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/>, which are both linked to the homepage of 
the European Society for the Study of English <http://www.essenglish.org/> (last 
visited 26/02/07).19 Those websites allow us to download 20,000 and 25,000 books, 
respectively, with, in my estimate, some 4 billion words (Diller 2008). In this deluge 
of data one has to make one’s own selection (which will always be questionable). 
I used a corpus of some 100 text files (see Appendix) which I had constructed 
for a different purpose, containing mostly 18th and 19th century novels, but also 
some philosophical works. My corpus clearly cannot claim to be balanced between 
registers (in contrast, for instance, to Tissari, this volume). But while balanced 
corpora must necessarily be corpora of text excerpts, my corpus consists of full 
texts, which enables me to risk zero-assertions (cf. section 1.2). When I say, e.g., 
“Colligation X does not occur before Jane Austen”, I may of course be faulted by a 
counter-example from an earlier novel which is not in my corpus. But my assertion, 
if true of the texts studied by me, will still say something significant about the texts 
18 The OED’s first records for happy (2b) and (4) are 1526 and 1523, respectively. The Wars of 
Alexander “was written not later than 1450” (Oakden 1930, I, 153). The Alphabet of Tales is dated 
“c1450” by the MED.
19 These websites offer texts in ASCII text-only format, which facilitates searches with simple, self-
written programs. For other websites see, e.g. <http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/connotations/bauer/
links.htm>.
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in my corpus: that those before Austen had no use for colligation X (and explaining 
why this is the case will be a worthy task in itself). No such significance can be 
derived from zero-assertions concerning a corpus of text excerpts: the absence of 
the colligation from any part of the corpus may be simply due to the accidents of 
sampling, not to any property of the texts from which the sample was taken. My 
unbalanced selection may even derive some justification from Tissari’s discovery 
that in her corpus (ARCHER) fiction is the genre showing the highest frequency of 
happy and happiness (this volume, beginning of section 3).
Even with a comparatively small selection of about 100 texts the returns will be 
much more numerous than from CMEPV, eMED and ICAMET. I obtained some 
6,000 occurrences of ModE happy and about 2,500 of ModE happiness.20 Clearly, 
the analysis cannot be as detailed as I have tried to make it in the ME part of 
this contribution. I have chosen a few colligations which promise to be revealing 
for my Erkenntnisinteresse, which is the borderline status of happiness between 
emotions and something “of a longer lasting and less obvious showing” (von Wright 
1963, 97, quoted section 1.2). The colligations chosen will be either compatible or 
incompatible with certain characteristics of emotions, such as:
(1) Emotions and happiness share the subjectivity postulate: in ModE a person cannot 
‘think’ he or she is happy (or angry, or sad, or glad). They either are, or are not. A 
construction which is incompatible with this postulate is THINK ONESELF .. HAPPY. 
Conversely, the construction BE .. HAPPY TO + Infinitive is fully compatible with the 
postulate. The two constructions will be shown to be in “diachronic complementary 
distribution”: authors tend to use either the one or the other.
(2) Notwithstanding (1) emotions are typically communicated by involuntary physical 
symptoms, like blushing, frowning, change of voice, etc. I will accordingly look for 
colligations showing happiness as visible or otherwise perceptible.
(3) Emotions are of limited duration, whereas according to the tradition we cannot 
be truly happy if we are conscious that our happiness is bound to end. This is why 
the Middle Ages distinguished between beatitudo and felicitas. Colligations showing 
happiness as temporary may be regarded as weakening the religious (or philosophical) 
content of the concept and thus deserve our attention.
(4) Time-spans are not always clearly distinguished from events taking place in them; 
a section on “Happy days, events, etc.” will deal with such overlap phenomena.
20 The ratio of adjectives to nouns is thus 2.4/1, hardly different from Tissari’s 2.5/1 (this volume, 
Table 3: 424/168).
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(5) The construction MAKE .. HAPPY is of particular interest because it involves more 
than one person. Participants may be more or less aware of the subjectivity postulate; 
the potential for conflict which that implies is of linguistic as well as narrative interest.
3.2 THINK ONESELF .. HAPPY and BE .. HAPPY TO + Infinitive 
The first construction is extensively used by Richardson (30 times) and Smollett 
(17). It was not found after Scott, who uses it four times. It is usually part of a polite 
formula, as in quotation (4).
(4) I shall think myself very happy to have it in my Power to serve your Ladyship. 
(Fielding, Tom Jones, Book IX, ch. 4, p. 566)
Very often it is preceded by a modal auxiliary and accompanied by a conditional 
clause; as in our example, it usually occurs in conversation. Perhaps one should 
not set too much store by such a frozen expression, but it is noteworthy that it 
should disappear with Scott. If it has gone out of conversational fashion we may 
suppose that it clashes with the more relaxed, more casual, more ‘emotional’ BE 
.. HAPPY TO + inf (see below). Taken literally, the formula is not an expression of 
feeling but an estimate of the speaker’s (potential) situation. The meaning of happy 
in this colligation is well described by the OED’s definition of sense 2a: “favoured by 
lot, position, or other external circumstance”. Its eighteenth-century ring becomes 
apparent when we look at 19th-century phrases which remotely resemble it:
(5) While I looked, I thought myself happy, and was surprised to find myself ere long 
weeping -- (Ch. Brontë, Jane Eyre, ch. 31, p. 460) 
(6) [N]o sooner had I wiped one salt drop from my cheek than another followed. Yet, I 
thought, I ought to have been happy, […]. (op. cit., p. 19) 
(7) Two such letters together made me think how far beyond my deserts I was beloved 
and how happy I ought to be. (Dickens, Bleak House, ch. 36, p. 515)
These are first-person narrators reflecting, at the moment of narration, on their 
emotional states in the narrated past. The solitary, un-social situation calls for self-
searching, not politeness.
The construction BE .. HAPPY TO does occur in the 18th century, but usually 
it describes the characters’ good fortune rather than their emotional state, as the 
following example from Tom Jones shows rather well (Lord Fellamar to Sophia 
Western): “Is it then, Madam, that I am so unhappy to be the Object of your Dislike 
and Scorn; […]?” (Book XVII, ch. 8, p. 903). If this were the kind of (un)happiness 
on which the subject is the supreme judge the question would be awkward, since 
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it would be directed at a person who knows less than the questioner. To become 
acceptable in PDE, it would have to be rephrased as Do I have the misfortune to 
…? or Am I the object of … (which would be most unfortunate)?
Another occurrence of the construction, also in Tom Jones (Book XI, ch. 2, 
p. 572), is not so easily disambiguated: Sophia says to a (putative) stranger with 
whom she is travelling some distance that “She was very happy to find they were 
both travelling the same Way.” This is clearly meant to be polite, but here there are 
at least two ways to be polite. Sophia may be saying that she regards it as fortunate 
to have a travelling companion; in that case happy describes her condition. Or she 
can say that she is pleased with the other’s company; in that case it describes 
her attitude to that condition, as it does in modern usage. The question seems 
undecidable because travelling the same way is half way between willed action and 
accepted condition. Travelling is willed but travelling the same way as someone 
else is not.
The next example is unambiguous:
(8) The marabout, as if happy to do their behests, bounded from the earth, and spun his 
giddy round before them with singular agility, […]. (Scott, Talisman, ch. 20, p. 800)
Jumping up and spinning round do not happen by chance or coincidence; they 
are fully intended by the agent. Moreover, the marabout’s happiness is inferred by 
the observers from his behaviour. This is how we know, and all we know, about the 
mental or emotional states of others. With Scott and Jane Austen this sort of being 
happy is becoming common, as Table 2 shows.21
N N/100,000 words N
N/100,000 
words
Scott 17 1.36 Ch. Brontë 5 1.06
Austen 70 9.73 A. Brontë 5 2.15
Carlyle/Emerson 1 0.06 Melville 2 0.05
Poe 5 0.11 G. Eliot 17 1.35
Thackeray 39 2.02 Hardy 1 0.09
Dickens 62 2.99 Galsworthy 2 2.13
Table 2. Happy to + infinitive. (Relative frequencies are only rough estimates calculated on the 
basis of file lengths)
21 To save space, tables contain only those authors in whose works the constructions in question 
have been found.
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3.3 Colligations Showing Symptoms of Happiness 
These can be of two kinds: the colligates are either verbs like look or seem, or they 
are nouns denoting parts of the expressive apparatus of the human body. Under 
LOOK I will also subsume the noun: a happy look will be counted. In this section it 
is particularly important to consider only colligations as opposed to collocations, as 
the following example may show (George Eliot, Daniel Deronda II, 133): “Happy the 
eye which saw all these things; but verily to hear only of them afflicts our soul.” The 
pattern is repeated twice, which would give us three instances of happy eye. But 
these eyes are not symptoms of an emotional state; they are channels of perception. 
Since the face is the only part of the expressive apparatus to colligate with happy 
with reasonable frequency, the others (eye, countenance, glance, smile, tear(s), 
accent) are lumped together in one category.
LOOK SEEM FACE others Total Rel. Freq.(N/100,000 words)
Burton 0 1 0 0 1 0.17
Richardson 1 0 0 0 1 0.07
Smollett 0 3 0 0 3 0.30
Scott 0 0 0 1 1 0.08
Austen 7 7 2 5 21 2.92
Cooper 1 1 0 0 2 0.55
Hawthorne 1 3 0 3 7 1.82
Thackeray 17 6 3 0 26 1.35
Dickens 10 2 6 4 22 1.06
Ch. Brontë 1 4 0 2 7 1.49
E. Brontë 0 0 0 1 1 0.87
A. Brontë 0 1 0 0 1 0.43
G. Eliot 13 3 3 2 21 1.67
Galsworthy 1 0 0 1 2 2.13
52 31 14 19 116 0.97
Table 3. Colligates showing symptoms of happiness.
In terms of relative frequency the difference between the 18th century (this 
time including Scott) and the 19th is remarkable. While most 19th-century authors 
show at least 1 pertinent colligation per 100,000 words, the highest mark in the 
18th is Smollett’s 0.3. Fielding, Johnson, and Mackenzie do not appear in this 
category at all.
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Even so, the pre-19th-century examples deserve a closer look. Apart from one 
LOOK in Richardson the only colligate is the verb SEEM. Semantically it is the 
least specific: unlike LOOK HAPPY, SEEM HAPPY is not necessarily mediated by 
a part of our body. This is shown particularly well by the one example from Burton’s 
Anatomy of Melancholy:
(9) Kings, princes, monarchs, and magistrates seem to be most happy, but look into 
their estate, you shall find them to be most encumbered with cares, in perpetual fear, 
agony, suspicion, jealousy. (p. 183; 1st Partition, Sect. II, Memb. III, Subsect. X)
The Anatomy, “one of the great psychological texts of all time” (Harré & Finlay-
Jones 1986, 223), is also a key text in the history of the concept of ‘happiness’. 
Melancholy, the early modern medical successor of the medieval deadly sin of 
Accidia (ib.), is an inability to be happy in circumstances which give us every reason 
to be so. But Burton’s aim is negative and pre-Enlightenment: to cure melancholy, 
not to pursue happiness – to accept conditions, not to change them. That may be 
one reason he hardly uses our diagnostic colligations and is thus severely under-
represented in this paper.
Before Jane Austen nouns denoting expressive organs do not colligate with 
happy. The change begun by her is symptomatic of two related phenomena: of 
the “immediate showing” which is alien to the earlier notion of happiness, and of 
the greater intimacy which seems to mark communication in 19th-century fiction. 
When the face communicates involuntarily in the 18th-century part of the corpus 
it usually expresses negative feelings like embarrassment or sadness. Often it is 
used with communicative intent, as when it is turned towards or away from the 
communication partner. This is a point where the syntax of happy passes into 
the communication of emotions in general, a topic which unfortunately cannot be 
gone into here. But the colligations studied are strong evidence that linguistically 
happiness is increasingly treated as an emotion.
3.4 Colligations Suggesting Happiness is Short-lived
There is an obvious group of colligates to be studied in this section: nouns denoting 
time-spans, from moment to year and life. We should also include life-phases like 
infancy, childhood, youth and adulthood, although happy youth occurs in the corpus 
only in the sense of ‘happy young man’, and adulthood not at all. Table 4 gives a 
full account of the findings; the smaller categories minute, morning, evening, week, 
fortnight, month, year, infancy, childhood are lumped together as ‘others’.
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 mo- ment hour day time life others Total
per 
100,000 words
Burton 0 0 1 1 2 0 4 0.66
Bunyan 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1.10
Defoe 0 0 0 0 3 1 4 0.91
Richardson 7 10 50 5 5 5 82 5.62
Fielding 1 3 4 0 0 1 9 1.44
Johnson 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2.78
Smollett 0 3 3 0 1 0 7 0.71
A.Smith 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.18
Scott 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 0.24
Austen 1 4 2 0 1 3 11 1.53
Cooper 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.28
Carlyle/Emerson 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0.75
Hawthorne 0 2 1 1 7 2 13 3.38
Thackeray 0 5 23 11 2 2 43 2.22
Dickens 2 2 7 10 17 4 42 2.03
Ch.Brontë 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0.43
A.Brontë 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0.87
G.Eliot 0 1 3 1 5 3 13 1.04
Hardy 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.88
Galsworthy 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1.06
Dreiser 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.64
Total 15 34 95 31 49 21 245
Table 4. Happy as attribute of nouns denoting periods of time.
The picture is far more ambiguous than in sections 3.2 and 3.3. Until now the 
19th century showed the far larger figures, but this table is dominated by Richardson, 
who accounts for one-third of the total, very distantly followed by Thackeray 
and Dickens. Only three other authors rise (just) into two-digit figures: Austen, 
Hawthorne and Eliot. These are absolute figures, but in relative terms Richardson’s 
position is just as striking.
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Figure 1. Happy as an attribute of nouns denoting periods of time.
We may conclude that, in general, time-span nouns are not terribly important, 
but figure 1 shows that Richardson and Thackeray (and to a lesser extent Dickens, 
too) owe their pre-eminence largely to their generous use of day.
A closer look at this apparent similarity reveals a remarkable difference. While 
Thackeray’s and Dickens’ happy days are part of the characters’ past and are 
remembered by them, Richardson’s are in the future and are ‘fixed’ (P. I 266 
[Journal continued, Friday afternoon], C. 581 L. 178), ‘nominated’ (C. 692 L. 216) 
and – repeatedly – ‘delayed’ (C. 660 L. 203, 693 L. 216, 704 L. 220, 843 L. 245). A 
large proportion of Richardson’s happy days are wedding days – hence the fixing, 
nominating and delaying. The consequences for the meaning of happy will become 
clear when we look beyond time-spans to what fills those time-spans. For the 
moment, suffice it to say that for Richardson’s pious ladies a happy hour or happy 
moment may be the moment of one’s death (P. II 183 L. 37, C. 1339 L. 465). It is not 
so, of course, for Lovelace (C. 465 L. 127).
3.5 Happy Days, Events, etc.
Even to Clarissa and Pamela these happy moments are not enjoyable in themselves 
but are forebodings of eternal happiness. In a similar fashion a happy day is not 
primarily called happy because one feels happy on such a day. The primary reason, 
especially in earlier texts, is that the day brings luck. Pamela, for instance, wants 
to marry on a Thursday because that is her happy day. Mr. B. makes fun of her 
superstition and perhaps even plays on the two senses of happy:
(10) I think you should begin now to make another day in the week a happy one; as for 
example, on a Monday, may you say, my father and mother concluded to be married on 
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the Thursday following. On a Monday […] my mother was preparing all her matters to 
be brought to bed on the Thursday following. […] On a Monday, I myself,” said he, “well 
remember it was that I wrote you the letter which prevailed on you so kindly to return to 
me; and on the same day you did return to my house here; which I hope, my girl, will be 
as propitious an era as any you have named! […] Thursday has reigned long enough 
o’conscience; let us now set Monday in its place […]: And then, I hope, we shall make 
Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, as happy days as Monday and 
Thursday […]. (P. I 292, Journal Continued, Monday)
What is here said of days can also be said of minutes or moments but also of 
entities which are not time units, such as events, presages and omens. As Table 
5 shows, happy event is common in Richardson and Smollett but disappears 
after Scott and Jane Austen, who still use it moderately. It is similar with happy 
presage and happy omen: after Smollett they disappear from the corpus (with 
a solitary exception in Poe). Dickens and George Eliot use good omen instead: 
event presage omen
Richardson 11 1 1
Smollett 6 7 5
Scott 3 0 0
J. Austen 4 0 0
Poe 0 0 1
Table 5. Happy as attribute of nouns pointing to the future.
This says little about a decline in superstition, as presage and omen remain quite 
common in 19th-century texts. But since they cease to colligate with happy it says 
a good deal about the meaning of that word. Rather than ‘fix’ or ‘nominate’ them, 
Thackeray’s and Dickens’ characters look back on happy days (or times, or hours). 
The evidence of the corpus shows eighteenth-century characters as happy in 
expectation, nineteenth-century characters in reminiscing or “in the flitting moment”, 
forgetful of both past and future (Hawthorne, Marble Faun, ch. 47, p. 1215).22
3.6 MAKE .. HAPPY: Who – Whom – by What Means – to What Effect?
MAKE .. HAPPY is a very common construction; about one-tenth of all instances of 
happy colligate with make. To exploit its potential for the identification of the senses 
of happy we must distinguish: 
22 According to Dr. Johnson, happiness in the present is possible only when one is drunk (McMahon 
2006, 245). Several quotations in that conversation (Boswell, 1934–1964 II, 351 [April 10, 1775]) 
suggest that the view that happiness was only to be expected in the future, not experienced in the 
present, was widely shared at the time.
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(a) the participants: ag(ent) makes ben(eficiary) happy;
(b) the means or instruments by which a person is made happy, e.g. help in an 
emergency, consolation, gestures of esteem or gratitude, etc.;
(c) the effect, the sort of happiness which results, e.g. passing pleasure or improved 
circumstances that ideally may last a lifetime. 
Participants and means are semantic roles and should not be confused with 
syntactic slots like subject, object or adjunct. To compare agents and beneficiaries 
across some 100 texts is hardly feasible, since to form sensible categories of 
characters would require detailed discussion of many texts and would remain highly 
arbitrary even after such an exercise.
What we can generalize about is the speech situations in which statements 
about happy-making occur. Do they occur in the narrative or in the dialogue? Is the 
beneficiary of the happy-making the speaker, the addressee, or a third person? A 
complete answer to the first question would require a careful distinction between 
various types of speech presentation (cf. Short 1988, 1996) which cannot be 
undertaken here. On a rough distinction between direct speech and reported 
speech on the one hand and the rest (including narrative) on the other we can 
say that Thackeray’s statements about happy-making occur relatively less often in 
dialogue than Dickens’:
Thackeray dial. narr. Dickens dial. narr.
B. Lyndon 2 3 Bleak House 14 8
H. Esmond 9 6 B. Rudge 2 1
Newcomes 23 10 Copperfield 10 5
Snobs 0 2 E. Drood 2 0
VF 6 9 Gr. Expect. 2 0
Virginians 2 3 N. Nickleby 7 0
Curiosity Shop 6 1
Ol. Twist 5 0
Total 42 33 48 15
Table 6. MAKE .. HAPPY in dialogue and narrative.
For Richardson such a statement would be problematic, as in epistolary novels 
the entire text is arguably dialogue as far as the choice of first and second person 
pronouns is concerned. It is all the more remarkable that Dickens’ percentages 
of first and second person beneficiaries should even exceed those of Richardson 
while both leave Thackeray far behind:
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Richardson 1st 2nd 3rd Thackeray 1st 2nd 3rd Dickens 1st 2nd 3rd 
Pamela 28 13 38 B. Lyndon 2 0 3 Bleak House 7 6 13
Clarissa 24 15 64 H. Esmond 1 4 11 B. Rudge 0 1 2
Newcomes 1 3 27 Copperfield 6 3 6
Snobs 0 0 2 E. Drood 1 0 1
VF 1 2 12 Gr. Expect. 0 2 0
Virginians 0 0 5 N. Nickleby 2 1 4
Curiosity 
Shop 3 0 4
Ol .Twist 2 1 2
Total 52 28 102 Total 5 9 60 Total 21 14 32
Percentages 28.6 15.4 56.0 6.8 12.1 81.1 31.3 20.1 47.8
Table 7. Beneficiaries of MAKE .. HAPPY: first, second, third person.
Considering the subjectivity postulate Thackeray is in a sense the most 
‘authorial’ narrator, i.e. the one who is most confident that he knows his characters’ 
emotional state.
A glance at the two Parts of Pamela reveals how the meaning of happiness can 
be negotiated in the course of a novel. Table 8 shows that, in this novel at least, 
happy-making proceeds mainly from social superiors to inferiors:
Part I Part II
Ag. Ben. Ag. Ben.
Mr. B. 25 4 7 6
Pamela 11 18 7 3
others 12 26 17 24
Table 8. Agents and beneficiaries in Pamela.
In Part I Mr B. is the agent of happy-making in the majority of cases, Pamela 
only in about one-fourth. When Pamela is agent, the beneficiaries are her socio-
economic inferiors, chiefly her parents, but also her (former) fellow-servants. In Part 
II, when Pamela is Mrs. B., the proportions are balanced, Mr. B. even becoming 
beneficiary twice as often as his wife. To a large extent happiness is thus identified 
with economic well-being. This is a view to which Pamela herself subscribes quite 
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candidly,23 although she always maintains that you cannot be happy if you betray 
your values and principles. The most eloquent reflection of this view is found in 
Letters 30 and 31 of Part I, where Mr. B.’s and her own understanding of happiness 
are contrasted. Mr. B. has offered “to make all your family happy” – provided she 
yield to his unchaste advances. She replies to his face: “he [her father] is happier 
already than ever he can be, if his daughter’s innocence is to be the price of your 
favour” (I 69 L. 30). Privately she translates his offer into her own and her parents’ 
language: “he will make my poor father and mother’s life comfortable” (I 71 L. 30).
These observations convey some idea of Richardson’s careful choice of words, 
but they do not lend themselves to the sort of generalizations that should be our 
concern. A better litmus test for the nature of happiness is to look at the ‘instruments’ 
or means by which it is bestowed. To stay with Pamela for a moment, an important 
difference between Mr. B. and Pamela is that his preferred instrument is financial 
support, whereas she accompanies her charitable gifts with gestures of kindness 
and with pious words. She also makes her neighbours and their servants “happy” 
by encouraging them to attend divine service (II 174 L. 34).
But whatever the differences between Mr. B. and his wife, they share one basic 
view of happiness: making-happy is always done with a view to the beneficiaries’ 
future; happiness is thought of as a long-term condition. Long-lasting happiness 
remains of course an important concern in the 19th century. But a closer look at 
the ‘instruments’ confirms what we have seen already: the emotion-like sort of 
happiness is gaining ground. This is particularly apparent in Thackeray’s novels. A 
poor wretch is “made happy by being allowed to win a few pieces” at the gambling 
table (Barry Lyndon, ch. 13, pp. 163/4), a young fellow is made happy by a sweet 
voice (The Newcomes, ch. 41, p. 437), George Osborne is asked: “Do something to 
make [Amelia] happy; a very little will” (VF, ch. 13, p. 117), after her mother’s death 
Amelia exerts herself “to make her old father happy” (VF, ch. 57, p. 553), in other 
words: to cheer him up.
Thackeray is of course a cynic concerning happiness, as his final words in 
The Newcomes (p. 806) show, where “the poet of Fable-land […] makes the hero 
and heroine happy at last, and happy ever after.” But temporary, emotion-like 
happiness is also a common feature in Dickens, as is equally well shown by the 
‘instruments’ used by his characters. Agnes makes David Copperfield’s time light 
and happy by reading to him (David Copperfield, ch. 18, p. 228). Kate Nickleby is 
made so happy by just looking at John Browdie that she could forget all her cares 
(Nicholas Nickleby, ch. 45, p. 584); Mrs. Maylie is made happy by Oliver’s gratitude 
23 E.g.: “I am far from thinking that a prudent regard to worldly interest misbecomes the character 
of a good clergyman.” (II 149 L. 32, Tuesday)
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(Oliver Twist, ch. 32, p. 206). Like other constructions MAKE .. HAPPY shows that 
happiness in the nineteenth century is more momentary than in the eighteenth. It 
also shows it is less understood in socio-economic terms.
4 Conclusions
I have studied the syntactic behaviour of a single word – a narrow subject with 
wide implications. At the beginning of this paper we found that the discourse on the 
concept of ‘happiness’ shows a number of discontinuities which make us wonder 
whether the users of the word are really referring to the same object. To at least 
partially answer this question I found it necessary to supplement the history of the 
concept with a history of word-use. The use of the adjective suggests continuity but 
not identity: rather something like a Wittgensteinian family resemblance. Tracing 
the use of happy has shown us a shift from ‘under conditions to be valued’ and 
‘creating conditions to be valued’ through ‘under conditions actually valued’ to 
‘valuing the conditions one is under’. The conditions themselves have changed, 
too: from success to lasting harmonious human relations and enjoyable moments. 
Tracing these changes provides a well-defined tertium under which a large number 
of authors can be compared. In an age of academic hyper-specialization such tertia 
may serve as tools for combining precise detailed analysis with a long perspective. 
They may also instil a readiness to revise or refine opinions in the face of compelling 
evidence. This, however, presupposes the irrevisible insight that there is such a 
thing as compelling evidence.
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Abbreviations
C.: Richardson, Clarissa
CMEPV: Corpus of Middle English Prose and Verse (added after titles not seen 
in print)
CT: Canterbury Tales
EETS: Early English Text Society
(e)MED: (electronic) Middle English Dictionary
ES: Extra Series
HF: Chaucer, The House of Fame
ICAMET: Innsbruck Computer Archive of Machine-Readable English Texts
L.: (numbered) Letter in P. or C.
OED: Oxford English Dictionary
OS: Original Series
P.: Richardson, Pamela
PDE: Present-Day English
SS: Supplementary Series
TrCr: Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde
VF: Thackery, Vanity Fair, ed. G. & K. Tillotson
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